(WW1), making pandemic influenza the main specific cause of disease deaths (ahead of such causes as malaria and dysentery 3, 4 ).
The epidemic curve for pandemic deaths was more drawn out in the Northern Hemisphere compared with the Southern Hemisphere, where it was concentrated in the month of November 1918.
Mortality rates also varied greatly by setting and were particularly high amongst troops in military camps 2, 5 . Significantly higher mortality rates were found amongst NZEF personnel who were: pandemic period (n = 218 cases, n = 221 controls) 7 . In the fully adjusted multivariable model, the following were found to be significantly associated with increased risk of death from pandemic influenza: 'age (25-29 years), pre-pandemic hospitalisations for a chronic condition (e.g. tuberculosis), relatively early year of military deployment, a relatively short time from enlistment to foreign service and having a larger chest size (e.g. adjusted odds ratio for 90-99 cm vs <90 cm was 2.45; 95% CI = 1.47-4.10)' (p. 329) 7 . Some of the findings in this study were consistent with previous research on risk factors (such as chronic conditions and age groups); however, others appear novel (e.g. larger chest size). In contrast, this study found no significant associations with military rank, occupational class at enlistment and rurality at enlistment.
One of the worst discrete outbreaks from the pandemic, in terms of high mortality rates for the NZEF personnel, occurred on a troop ship (Tahiti, July 1918). In this outbreak the mortality risk was increased amongst those aged 25-34 years 8 . Being accommodated in cabins rather than sleeping in hammocks in other areas was also associated with increased mortality risk (rate ratio 4.28, 95% CI:
2.69-6.81). Similarly, being in a particular military unit, the 'field artillery' (who were probably housed in cabins), was also associated with increased risk (adjusted odds ratio in logistic regression 3.04, 95% CI: 1.59-5.82). The poor ventilation of the cabins along with crowding may therefore have played roles in the mortality risk in this outbreak.
Relevance for today?
The 1918-1919 influenza pandemic is still probably the greatest natural disaster in recorded history in terms of loss of human life. It is therefore important to understand the risk factors, some of which may be modifiable, that determined vulnerability during this event.
The detailed military records for the First World War period at an individual and group level, allow for the exploration of such risk factors (as with the various studies detailed above). But there is still much to learn and in particular, the strange age-distribution of mortality risk still needs to be better explained (although it may relate to exposure to a previous pandemic 9 ).
Reflecting on the historical experience of how the military authorities responded to this pandemic may also be useful in guiding future pandemic planning and response. We briefly discuss some possibilities below. , and it seems likely that crowding in these camps was a likely contributing factor.
The situation in the Featherston military camp (in the lower North
Island of the country) was probably made worse by some of the men using tents for accommodation, many of which had been blown down during a severe storm 5 . Furthermore, the crowding on the troop ship Tahiti is likely to have contributed to the particularly high mortality rate in this outbreak.
In planning for future pandemics, military authorities could therefore consider plans to rapidly reduce personnel numbers in crowded or high population density settings such as in some military camps and on non-essential military vessels. Such an approach could also apply to boarding schools, university hostels and even low security risk prison inmates. Of course crowding is good to avoid in terms of preventing other infectious diseases in the modern era as well 10 .
Being prepared for future pandemic waves. New Zealand, there appears to be substantial scope for improving respiratory 12 and hand hygiene 13 .
Planning for 'protective sequestration' in some settings. This particular control measure refers to preventing human movement at a border or area boundary so as to limit the spread of infection into such an area (it differs somewhat from quarantine -where the focus is on preventing spread from potential cases who may be incubating disease, and isolation where the focus is on preventing spread from identified cases). Such a control measure failed in 1918 in the case of the troop ship Tahiti as the measures to prevent disease spread from the shore or other ships were inadequate.
Promptly closing military camps to try to protect them was not 
